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  21. Introduction  
Audit opinions attest to the fair presentation of financial statements and they alert investors to 
significant problems affecting the interpretation of accounting information. Unfavorable audit 
opinions are associated with falling share prices (Fleak and Wilson, 1994), perhaps because they 
signal impending bankruptcy (Chen and Church, 1996) and because they make it harder for 
companies to raise capital (Firth, 1980). Unfavorable opinions might also cause falls in executive 
remuneration or lead to management changes. These factors mean managers have incentives to 
strategically dismiss auditors in order to avoid unfavorable audit opinions (e.g., Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 1988) – this practice is known as ‘opinion shopping’. Audit 
committees are expected to prevent opinion shopping since opinion shopping impairs the integrity of 
the audit reporting process, and the hiring and firing of audit firms is an important responsibility of 
the audit committee. This paper tests whether companies engage in opinion shopping, and 
investigates the role of audit committees when auditors are dismissed.
1  
  The extant literature draws conflicting conclusions about whether companies engage in 
opinion shopping, and no previous study examines the mitigating influence of audit committees. I use 
the methodology of Lennox (2000) to predict how likely companies would receive unfavourable 
audit opinions from retained incumbent audit firms and from new audit firms. A comparison of these 
predicted opinions with companies’ dismissal decisions shows that opinion shopping is a highly 
significant predictor of audit firm dismissals in the US. This result is consistent with UK evidence 
(Lennox, 2000), but it is inconsistent with prior US research that argues opinion shopping is futile 
(e.g., Krishnan, 1994).
  I also find opinion shopping dismissals occur significantly later in the 
                                                           
1 Espahbodi and Hendrickson (1991) argue, “Several factors motivate managers to shop for opinions, including the desire to attain or 
exceed stated goals and objectives, and, in extreme cases, the urgent need to survive. Managers want their audit reports to be positive 
(unqualified). Negative reports may affect their own compensation, their company’s ability to market securities, and the value of their own 
holdings in the company. Motivation to shop for opinions can be enhanced by deteriorating economic conditions, trying to avoid hostile 
takeover attempts, and by having compensation plans tied to reported income . . . Unfortunately, it is clear that the search for a second 
opinion is not always motivated by a desire to be right. Some managers have a preconceived objective in mind that can only be achieved by 
using a particular, and usually less desirable, accounting treatment. This agreeable accountant will receive a reward in the form of 
appointment as the business’s auditor. This insidious practice is not the seeking of a second opinion; it is opinion shopping . . . Excluding 
management from auditor hiring-paying-firing could deter opinion shopping. This might possibly be accomplished through an effective 
audit committee.” 
  3reporting period compared to other dismissals and this is consistent with three explanations. First, an 
opinion shopping company delays the auditor dismissal decision in order to form a more accurate 
assessment of the opinion that would be issued if the incumbent audit firm were retained. Second, an 
opinion shopping company delays the auditor change so that the incoming audit firm has less time to 
uncover problems. Third, an opinion shopping company spends more time searching out a compliant 
audit firm. The timing difference is consistent with Schwartz and Soo (1996a) who argue that 
companies which replace their auditors early (late) in the reporting period do so for positive (negative 
reasons) and experience shorter (longer) reporting delays. 
  The audit committee is part of a regulatory framework that emphasises disclosure and 
transparency in financial reporting (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999), and auditor hiring and firing is 
cited as a major responsibility of the audit committee (e.g., SEC, 1978). Item 304 of Regulation S-K 
requires SEC registrants to disclose whether audit committees recommend or approve auditor 
changes. Since opinion shopping makes audit reporting less transparent, I hypothesize that audit 
committees are more likely to disapprove (not recommend) dismissals that are motivated by opinion 
shopping. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find a significant negative relation between audit 
committee approval and opinion shopping. This result continues to hold when I control for the fact 
that some audit committees do not participate in audit firm dismissal decisions, and when I control 
for the endogeneity of audit committee activity.  
  Next, I test the association between audit committee disapproval of opinion shopping and the 
departure of members from the audit committee. I find a higher departure rate when audit committees 
disapprove of opinion shopping and this is consistent with two explanations. First, audit committee 
members resign because they do not wish to be associated with opinion shopping dismissals. Second, 
managers remove disapproving audit committee members in order to exert more influence over the 
auditor dismissal decision and thereby avoid unfavorable audit opinions. In further tests, I find the 
association between audit committee disapproval and turnover is driven by the departure of 
  4independent rather than affiliated audit committee members. Therefore, opinion shopping not only 
impairs the integrity of audit reporting, but it also weakens the audit committee’s role in auditor 
selection. 
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the extant literature on 
opinion shopping and audit committees, and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 tests whether US 
companies engage in opinion shopping and compares the timing of opinion shopping dismissals with 
other dismissals. Section 4 tests whether audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping and 
examines the association between audit committee disapproval and the departure of audit committee 
members. Section 5 summarises the paper’s main results and the implications for public policy. 
 
2. Extant literature and hypothesis development  
2.1 Opinion shopping 
The extant literature draws conflicting conclusions about whether companies engage in opinion 
shopping. US studies claim opinion shopping is futile since incoming auditors’ first opinions are not 
generally more favorable than outgoing auditors’ final opinions (e.g. Krishnan, 1994).
2 Lennox 
(2000) argues a comparison of opinions issued by outgoing and incoming auditors is a flawed test for 
opinion shopping. Instead, he predicts how likely companies would receive unfavorable audit 
opinions if audit firm changes are different to those actually observed, and he shows opinion 
shopping is a highly significant predictor of audit firm changes in the UK. This paper applies the 
methodology of Lennox (2000) to SEC registrants in order to determine whether extant conclusions 
differ because of differences in empirical methodologies or because of institutional differences 
between the UK and US. 
  There are important institutional differences that make opinion shopping less likely in the US 
compared to the UK. The SEC has strict auditor change disclosure requirements whereas the UK 
  5does not require notification of auditor changes to the London Stock Exchange. SEC registrants file 
8-K forms promptly disclosing audit firm changes and any auditor-client disagreements or modified 
opinions in the two preceding years. The AICPA SEC Practice Section requires outgoing auditors to 
notify the SEC independently when there is a change in auditor, thereby enabling the SEC to identify 
non-filers (Schwartz and Soo, 1996b). These disclosure requirements make it more difficult and 
costly for managers to hide unfavourable information when they change auditors, and this reduces 
managers’ incentives to engage in opinion shopping. For example, Smith and Nichols (1982) find a 
significant negative market reaction when auditor change disclosures involve auditor-client 
disagreements, and this increases the cost of changing auditor to managers that own equity or options.    
  An alternative explanation for the different conclusions about opinion shopping is that they 
reflect different testing methodologies. The conclusion that US companies do not engage in opinion 
shopping is based on a comparison of the opinions issued by outgoing and incoming auditors – the 
opinions of companies that do not change auditors are ignored. In contrast, Lennox (2000) uses data 
on both auditor changes and auditor retentions to predict how likely companies would receive 
unfavourable opinions if they make opposite switch decisions. He finds that a failure to sample 
auditor retentions leads to an (incorrect) inference that UK companies do not engage in opinion 
shopping. 
  This paper discriminates between the institutional and methodological explanations by 
applying the methodology of Lennox (2000) to US data. If the different conclusions are due to 
methodology rather than institutional factors, it is expected that US companies do engage in opinion 
shopping. The first hypothesis (in alternative form) is therefore: 
 
H1: US companies successfully engage in opinion shopping 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) examine the association between earnings management and audit firm changes. They find 
discretionary accruals are income decreasing during the last year with the outgoing auditor and insignificant during the first year with the 
  62.2 The extant literature on the association between audit committees and financial reporting 
Some studies show audit committees are associated with higher quality financial reporting. DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1991) find earnings overstatements are less prevalent in companies that have audit 
committees. Similarly Dechow et al., (1996) demonstrate that companies with audit committees are 
less likely to commit fraud compared to a control sample matched by industry and size. Wild (1994) 
finds an increase in the informativeness of accounting numbers after companies voluntarily form 
audit committees. Similarly, Klein (2000a) finds the informativeness of accounting data is positively 
related to audit committee independence. For a sample of distressed companies, Carcello and Neal 
(2000) show auditors issue going concern opinions more often when audit committee members are 
independent of senior management. Recent studies also find that earnings management is negatively 
related to audit committee characteristics such as independence, meeting activity, and financial 
literacy (Chtourou et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2001). 
To some extent, it is difficult to draw policy conclusions from the above studies because it is 
difficult to determine the direction of causality between audit committees and financial reporting 
integrity. Managers that are inclined to commit fraud or issue misleading accounting numbers have 
less incentive to set up independent audit committees. Therefore, the reported association between 
audit committees and financial reporting quality might simply reflect the underlying incentives of 
senior management. Consistent with this argument, Klein (2002) finds managers’ economic 
incentives are important determinants of audit committee independence. This study addresses the 
causality issue by investigating what audit committees do, rather than testing for a statistical 
association between audit committee characteristics (i.e., existence, independence) and observed 
financial reporting outcomes. 
Other studies provide evidence of no association between audit committee characteristics and 
financial reporting quality. Beasley (1996) finds no association between audit committee existence 
and financial statement fraud. Klein (2000b) finds no significant relation between earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
incoming auditor, which is consistent with managers dismissing incumbent auditors in response to auditor conservatism. 
  7management and 100% audit committee independence. Menon and Williams (1994) find the 
likelihood of forming an independent audit committee is insignificantly associated with various 
proxies of the demand for financial reporting quality. They also show voluntarily formed audit 
committees hold meetings infrequently, and they conclude that committees are often created for 
appearance rather than because companies rely on them. Overall then, the evidence is mixed 
concerning whether audit committees improve the quality of financial reporting. 
 
2.3 The role of audit committees when companies dismiss their auditors 
As a sub-committee of the board of directors, the audit committee is an important corporate 
governance mechanism for monitoring senior management (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). 
Regulators and audit committee guides cite auditor hiring and firing as a primary responsibility of the 
audit committee (e.g., SEC, 1978; American Bar Association, 1978; Conference Board, 1988; 
Cadbury Committee, 1992; Auditing Practices Board, 1994; Braiotta et al., 1999; National Office of 
Audit and Accounting, 2001). The audit committee is expected to act on behalf of shareholders in 
maintaining the integrity of the auditing process, rather than allow opportunistic management to 
choose their own auditor. In a survey study, Kalbers (1992) finds both audit committee members and 
auditors believe the audit committee has an important influence on auditor choice. However, there is 
little archival evidence on the role of audit committees when companies change auditors. Abbott and 
Parker (2000) find companies with both active and independent audit committees are more likely to 
hire industry-specialist auditors, but they find the effects of activity and independence are 
insignificant when tested separately. This study provides a unique look at whether audit committees 
are discharging their responsibilities regarding auditor dismissals. 
Membership of an audit committee bonds the director to oversee the integrity of financial 
reporting on behalf of outside directors who do not sit on the audit committee (Reinstein et al., 1984; 
Abbott and Parker, 2000). Courts hold that audit committee members owe standards of care that 
  8exceed those of other outside directors, because audit committee members have access to inside 
accounting information and because they implicitly agree to oversee the integrity of auditing (Olson, 
1999).
3 Audit committee members face economic losses from litigation and reputation impairment if 
they fail to detect accounting irregularities. Since the oversight of auditor changes is a primary 
function of the audit committee and since opinion shopping diminishes the integrity of audit 
reporting, audit committees should disapprove of disapprovals that are motivated by opinion 
shopping. My second hypothesis is therefore: 
 
H2: Audit committees are more likely to disapprove of opinion shopping dismissals than other 
dismissals  
 
I use models of audit opinion reporting and auditor dismissal to predict whether dismissals 
are motivated by opinion shopping. Since my opinion shopping variable is predicted, there is no 
endogeneity problem when using it to explain audit committee approval.  
I obtain audit committee approval data from companies’ 8-K filings. Item 304 of Regulation 
S-K requires that SEC registrants disclose whether auditor changes are recommended or approved by 
audit committees (e.g., SEC, 1995).
4 I search for the words ‘approved’ or ‘recommended’ as evidence 
that an audit committee approves the auditor dismissal.
5 It is important to note that I do not assume 
audit committee non-approval is equivalent to disapproval. Rather I allow for the fact that an audit 
committee may not approve an audit firm dismissal because it does not participate in the dismissal 
                                                           
3 In Dubowski v. Ash, 606 E Supp. 600, 605 (S. D. N. Y. 1985), audit committee members were held responsible for reviewing the 
independent auditor even though they were not officers of the company. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 E Supp. 974, 980 
(E. D. N. Y. 1995) the audit committee was charged with “overseeing the conduct of MTC’s accountants”. In AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 
928 E Supp. 1239, 1259-61 (S. D. N. Y 1996) the audit committee was accused of being “wilfully blind” in its oversight of the audit firm.  
4 Accounting Series Release No. 247 (SEC, 1978) required that companies disclose only whether audit committees reviewed auditor 
changes - this was subsequently amended by Item 304 of Regulation S-K. 
5 When the audit committee does not approve auditor dismissal, the 8-K filing either does not disclose who approves the dismissal or it 
discloses approval by other individuals (usually the full board of directors). In a few cases, the audit committee approves the appointment of 
the new audit firm but not the dismissal decision. These observations are coded as non-approvals, but the reported results are robust to 
dropping these observations. 
  9decision. It is important to account for audit committee non-participation since extant research finds 
some audit committees are inactive (Menon and Williams, 1994).
6  
Fig. 1 illustrates an audit committee’s participation and approval decisions when an auditor is 
dismissed. The audit committee first decides whether to participate in the auditor dismissal decision and 
a participation dummy ( ) equals one if the audit committee participates. If the audit committee does 
not participate ( ) then, by definition, it cannot approve the auditor dismissal. If the audit 
committee does participate ( ), an approval dummy (
PA
0 = PA
1 = PA AP) equals one if the committee approves 
and equals zero if it disapproves. An 8-K filing discloses only the joint product of the audit 
committee’s participation and approval decisions ( AP PA× ). An auditor dismissal is approved 
( AP PA×  = 1) if the audit committee both participates ( 1 = PA ) and does not disapprove ( 1 = AP ). 
A dismissal is not approved ( AP PA×   = 0) either because the committee does not participate 
( ) or because it participates and disapproves ( 0 = PA 1 = PA , 0 = AP ). Since PA and  AP are jointly 
observed in the 8-K filing, it is important to identify whether non-approval ( AP PA×
A
 = 0) is due to 
non-participation or disapproval. The distinction is important because non-participation indicates an 
ineffective audit committee, whereas an effective audit committee should disapprove of opinion 
shopping. I distinguish between non-participation and disapproval by simultaneously estimating 
probit models that take into account the partial observability of the PA and  P variables (Maddala, 
1983). 
  
[INSERT FIG. 1 HERE] 
 
  I predict audit committee participation using the level of, and change in, audit committee 
meeting activity during the auditor dismissal year. Although audit committee meetings are not 
perfectly correlated with participation, the statistical results are highly significant so lack of precision 
from measurement error is not an important limitation. Three empirical findings show that meeting 
                                                           
6 For example, Kalbers (1992) reports that some, but not all, audit committees take an active role with regard to audit fees and audit scope. 
  10activity is a good predictor of audit committee participation. First, I find a significant increase in the 
number of audit committee meetings during the auditor dismissal year, suggesting that audit 
committees arrange extra meetings in order to discuss auditor changes. Second, when audit 
committees do not approve audit firm dismissals, there is a smaller increase in meeting activity 
during the auditor dismissal year and a lower level of audit committee activity. This suggests that 
some audit committee non-approvals ( AP PA×  = 0) are due to non-participation (  = 0) rather 
than disapproval (  = 1, 
PA
PA AP = 0). Third, there is a significant increase in meeting activity during 
the auditor dismissal year even when audit committees do not approve audit firm dismissals. This 
indicates some audit committee non-approvals are due to disapproval rather than non-participation.  
  Although audit committee meetings are strongly correlated with audit committee 
participation, it is acknowledged that meeting data have two limitations. First, an endogeneity 
problem could arise because audit committees meet to discuss events other than audit firm dismissals 
(e.g., the issuance of financial results). If the other events discussed by audit committees are 
correlated with companies’ dismissal decisions there is endogeneity bias. Second, not all companies 
that have audit committees disclose the number of audit committee meetings. My concern is that a 
company might not disclose the number of meetings if the audit committee does not meet (i.e, it may 
not disclose zero meetings), in which case incomplete disclosure results in an over-statement of audit 
committee activity. I control for these endogeneity and disclosure bias issues using company size as 
an instrumental variable to predict audit committee meeting activity. First, company size is an ideal 
instrument to control for endogeneity, because it is exogenous and because it is a strong predictor of 
meeting activity. Menon and Williams (1994) show that audit committees in large companies are 
more active because scale economies result in greater net monitoring benefits. Second, company size 
data are available for all audit firm dismissals so I am able to avoid the problem of disclosure bias by 
  11predicting meeting activity for the full sample.
7 I therefore control for endogeneity and disclosure 
bias when testing H2.  
  Finally, I hypothesise that audit committees are more likely to lose independent audit 
committee members when they disapprove of opinion shopping, for two reasons. First, senior 
management exert greater control over the audit committee and hence over the auditor dismissal 
decision if they remove audit committee members who object to opinion shopping. Second, the 
authority of the audit committee is compromised when a company dismisses its auditor despite 
disapproval from the audit committee. It is therefore expected that audit committee members are 
more likely to resign when an audit committee disapproves of an opinion shopping dismissal but the 
company still dismisses. These two arguments apply more strongly to audit committee members who 
are independent of senior management, since their incentives are more closely aligned with those of 
investors rather than senior management. The third hypothesis is therefore: 
 
H3: There is a higher departure rate of independent audit committee members when audit 
committees disapprove of opinion shopping
8 
 
3. Identifying opinion shopping companies 
This section is structured as follows. Sub-section 3.1 explains the methodology employed to test for 
opinion shopping. Sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the dependent and control variables. Sub-section 
3.4 investigates whether scope exists for opinion shopping. Sub-section 3.5 tests whether companies 
                                                           
7 Section 4.3 provides evidence of significant disclosure bias. When companies disclose meeting activity the mean number of audit 
committee meetings is 2.35, but when companies do not disclose the mean predicted number of audit committee meetings is 2.00 which is 
significantly lower.  
8 Three points are worth noting in connection with H3. First, companies do not disclose whether audit committee members depart because 
of dismissal or resignation. To some extent, this does not matter since H3 results in weaker audit committees irrespective of whether 
departures are dismissals or resignations. Second, companies do not disclose how individual audit committee members vote so the analysis 
considers approval or disapproval by the audit committee as a whole. Third, H3 is silent on whether departing audit committee members 
remain with the company. Senior management exert more influence over the auditor dismissal decision even if the departing audit 
committee member remains on the board. On the other hand, senior managers exert more influence over other monitoring functions (e.g., 
the compensation or nominating committees) if the dissenting audit committee member is dismissed from the board. It has already been 
noted that audit committee members owe a greater duty of care than other outside directors when accounting irregularities occur. Therefore, 
an audit committee member who resigns faces a lower threat of litigation even if she remains with the company. On the other hand, an audit 
committee member who resigns could leave the company if she is uncomfortable with the actions of senior management.  
  12engage in opinion shopping, and it compares the timing of opinion shopping dismissals with other 
dismissals. 
 
3.1 Methodology for testing opinion shopping 
Scope for opinion shopping depends on whether significant reporting differences exist between 
retained and newly appointed auditors. Reporting differences make opinion shopping possible since a 
company can condition its dismissal decision on whether a new auditor or its incumbent auditor 
would more likely give a favourable audit opinion. The methodology employed tests whether scope 
exists for opinion shopping, and whether companies exploit this scope to avoid unfavorable audit 
opinions. 
For lack of a better terminology, an unfavorable audit opinion is henceforth described as 
‘modified’ (  = 1) and any other opinion is termed ‘unmodified’ (  = 0). The final opinion of 
an outgoing auditor is given at t-1 ( ). An auditor dismissal dummy (   equals one if 
company i appoints a new auditor, or zero if it retains its incumbent auditor. The issued audit opinion 
 depends on the auditor dismissal decision ( , the opinion received prior to the dismissal 
decision  , and a vector of other explanatory variables  . The conditional probability that 
company i receives a modified opinion is written as 
it M
) 1 − it
it M
1 − it M ) it D
) ( it M ) it D
Pr(
(M ) ( it X
) 1 = D
it M  where the D superscript denotes the 
auditor dismissal decision. Company i receives a modified report with probability Pr(  if it 
retains its incumbent auditor and with probability Pr(  if it hires a new auditor. Company i 
engages in opinion shopping if it dismisses its auditor when Pr(  >    and if it 
retains when   ≤  .  
) 1 0 = it M
) 1 =
) 1 1 = it M
) 1 0 = it M 1 Pr( it M
) 1 0 = it Pr(M ) 1 1 Pr( = it M
Estimation takes place in two stages. First, I estimate a probit model of audit opinion 
reporting that tests whether reporting differences exist between retained and new auditors. Next, I 
  13predict the difference between opinion probabilities ( -) ) and I test whether 
companies condition their dismissal decisions on whether incumbent or new audit firms are more 
likely to issue unmodified opinions. If the coefficient on P -) P  is positive in the 
auditor dismissal model, I conclude companies engage in opinion shopping (H1).  
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M
0 r( ˆ = it M
1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
) 1 1 r( ˆ = it M 1
The audit opinion reporting model is: 
it v it X it D it M it D it D it X it M it M + × + − × + + + − + = 5 1 4 3 2 1 1 0 γ γ γ γ γ γ     (1) 
The  1 γ  coefficient on prior opinions   is expected to be positive because extant research finds 
strong persistence in audit opinion reporting (e.g., Monroe and Teh, 1993; Lennox, 2000). As 
discussed later, the X  vector includes control variables that previous studies show are associated 
with modified audit opinions (e.g., profitability, liquidity, leverage, default, company size, and 
growth). The auditor dismissal dummy ( ) and interaction terms (
) 1 ( − it M
it D
it
1 − × it M it D  and  it X it D × ) 
capture reporting asymmetries between retained and new auditors. Reporting differences exist 
between new and retained auditors if  3 γ ,  4 γ , or  5 γ  are statistically significant. 
The difference between modified opinion probabilities (P -) ) is predicted 
from eq. (1) and included in an auditor dismissal model as follows: 
) 1 0 r( ˆ = it M 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
it u it Z it M it M it D + + = = + = 2   )   ) 1 1 r( P ˆ - ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0 θ θ θ       ( 2 )  
The opinion shopping variable ( - ) captures the effect of reporting differences 
on auditor dismissal decisions, and 
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M
1
) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
θ  is positive if companies engage in opinion shopping (H1). The 
  vector includes control variables that previous studies show are associated with audit firm 
changes (these are discussed later). 
it Z
 
3.2. Audit firm dismissals and audit opinions 
  14Data on audit firm changes are obtained from AUDITOR-TRAK, which is a more comprehensive 
source than COMPUSTAT.
9 Each auditor change is checked against the corresponding 8-K filing to 
identify whether the change is a dismissal or resignation. Audit firm resignations are dropped from 
the sample because opinion shopping concerns companies’ dismissal decisions.
10 Audit firm changes 
are also dropped when: (a) an 8-K filing does not disclose whether the change is a dismissal or 
resignation, (b) the change is mutually agreed by the auditor and client, or (c) the client and auditor 
disagree about whether the change is a dismissal or a resignation. This leaves a sample of 18,445 
auditor retentions and 828 dismissals (4.30%). 
There are four types of audit opinion in the sample: (1) ‘unqualified without explanatory 
language’, (2) ‘unqualified with explanatory language’, (3) ‘qualified’, and (4) ‘opinion disclaimer’. 
COMPUSTAT does not provide further information on explanatory language, qualifications or 
disclaimers, so opinion types (2)-(4) are collected by hand from 10-K filings.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 1 details the different types of audit opinions. Panel A shows the most frequent opinion 
is unqualified without explanatory language (87.40%). Unqualified with explanatory language 
opinions are shown in Panels B-E, qualified opinions are in Panel F and opinion disclaimers are in 
panel G. Unqualified with explanatory language opinions are grouped into Panels B-E according to 
the type of language used. Panel B shows 5.75% of opinions are unqualified with harmless 
                                                           
9 COMPUSTAT provides audit firm names only for clients of the ‘Big five’ and 18 medium-sized audit firms. AUDITOR-TRAK 
(Strafford Publications) summarizes and supplements information contained in the Public Accounting Report on audit firm changes. 
Mayper and Addy (1991) show the Public Accounting Report is more than 99% accurate in reporting audit firm changes.  A few 
discrepancies are found between AUDITOR-TRAK and COMPUSTAT regarding the timing of auditor changes and these are resolved by 
checking auditor change dates and audit firm names in 8-K and 10-K filings. AUDITOR-TRAK includes audit firm mergers as changes but 
these are classified in the paper as non-dismissals. The largest audit firm merger during the sample period (1996-98) involves Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand. I identify other audit firm mergers by reading 8-K filings to see why the change occurs. 
10 Some 8-K filings might incorrectly disclose audit firm dismissals as resignations, for example if a company requests the resignation of its 
incumbent auditor. Extant research finds significant differences between disclosed audit firm resignations and dismissals (e.g., DeFond et 
al., 1997), indicating few dismissals are incorrectly disclosed as resignations. 
  15explanatory language.
11 Panel C shows 6.10% of opinions are modified because of going concern 
difficulties.
12  Panel D contains unqualified opinions where the explanatory language refers to a 
fundamental uncertainty other than going concern (usually litigation). Panel E contains other 
modified opinions where the explanatory language would likely be viewed as unfavorable.
13 Panel F 
contains qualified (‘except for’) opinions which are issued in one of two circumstances: (a) there is a 
reporting disagreement if an auditor believes part of the financial statements is not fairly presented 
(typically GAAP non-compliance), or (b) there is a limitation on audit scope if an auditor is unable to 
collect sufficient evidence on part of the financial statements.
14 
15  Panel G contains opinion 
disclaimers, which are issued when the scope limitation is so severe that the auditor is unable to form 
an opinion about whether the financial statements are fair.  
  It is necessary to map the different types of opinions into a quantitative variable. Since the 
opinions in Panels A and B are not unfavorable, they are coded as unmodified ( ). Going 
concern opinions warn about bankruptcy, fundamental uncertainties indicate high risk, and 
qualifications and opinion disclaimers are unfavorable, so the opinions in Panels C, D, F and G are 
modified ( ). The Panel E opinions also appear to be unfavourable so they are coded as 
0 = it M
1 = it M
                                                           
11 Explanatory language is assumed to be harmless if it contains one or more of the following statements: (a) the financial statements 
comply with SEC regulations, (b) the opinion is shared with another audit firm, (c) there is a change in accounting principles, or (d) certain 
events affect the comparability or consistency of current and prior year financial statements. Auditors refer to changes in accounting 
principles when there is a material effect on the financial statements. Most changes in accounting principles occur because of new 
accounting standards rather than for voluntary reasons, so (c) is assumed to be harmless. Voluntary changes in accounting principles might 
be viewed as harmless or unfavorable (e.g., opportunistic earnings management), so it is unclear how these opinions should be coded. In 
unreported results, the paper’s conclusions are found to be robust when these opinions are dropped from the sample. Events that affect 
financial statement comparability include mergers, acquisitions, significant corporate transactions and changes in accounting entities - these 
are all viewed as harmless. The only consistency opinion classified as unfavourable is where reference is made to accounting errors or 
irregularities – these are shown in Panel E rather than Panel B. 
12 There are 171 audit opinions that disclose the company is in bankruptcy or adopts fresh start reporting after emerging from bankruptcy 
protection (these opinions usually include statements about going concern uncertainty). Bankruptcy is a public signal of poor performance 
and uncertainty irrespective of the audit opinion, so bankrupt observations are dropped from the sample. 
13 Some opinions disclose financial distress (e.g., sale of a significant part of the company’s operations, debt refinancing) but presumably 
the auditor believes the distress is not so severe that it warrants a going concern opinion. Some opinions indicate existing problems (e.g., 
lack of compliance with SEC filing requirements, criminal investigation) while others hint at potential problems (e.g., related party 
transactions). 
14 Trusts are allowed to use modified cash basis accounting rather than GAAP – these opinions are dropped from the sample rather than 
classed as audit qualifications.  
15 An auditor issues an except for opinion only if she concludes the overall financial statements are fair. An adverse opinion should be 
issued when an auditor believes the overall financial statements are not fair - there are no adverse opinions in the sample. 
  16modified.
16 This results in a sample of 17,952 unmodified opinions and 1,321 modifications (6.8%), 
most of which mention going concern problems. Attention now turns to the control variables in the 
audit opinion (eq. (1)) and auditor dismissal (eq. (2)) models.  
 
3.3 Control variables 
Extant research shows financially distressed companies receive modified opinions more often than 
healthy companies (e.g., Chen and Church, 1992; Monroe and Teh, 1993; Krishnan, 1994), and 
distressed companies are more likely to change auditors (Menon and Schwartz, 1985; Krishnan, 
1994; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). My financial health variables are profitability ( ), 
liquidity ( ), leverage ( ), and corporate default ( ). Profitability is net income 
divided by total assets, liquidity is current assets divided by current liabilities, leverage is total 
liabilities divided by total assets, and the default dummy indicates the company’s default status 
(  equals one if the company is in default in the period -365 to +90 days around the year-end). 
Financial ratios are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Moody’s provide the default data.
it PROF
it LIQ it LEV it DEF
it DEF
17 
Small companies receive modified opinions more often than large companies (e.g., Monroe 
and Teh, 1993; Krishnan, 1994) and small companies are more likely to change auditors (Krishnan et 
al., 1996). Therefore, the audit opinion and auditor dismissal models control for company size 
                                                           
16 There are three possible objections to this mapping of the audit opinion variable. First, the coding of the Panel E opinions is 
inappropriate if they are favorable. In unreported results, the paper’s conclusions are found to be robust when: (1) the Panel E opinions are 
dropped from the sample, (2) the Panel E opinions are classified as unmodified, or (3) some Panel E opinions are classified as modified 
(e.g., accounting errors) and others are classified as unmodified (e.g., death of CEO). The robustness is unsurprising since Panel E accounts 
for only 0.43% of opinions. Second, it might be argued that disclaimers (Panel G) are more negative than qualifications (Panel F), which in 
turn are more negative than unqualified opinions. However, a separate analysis of these opinions is impractical since there are only 11 
qualifications and 13 disclaimers. Third, multiple bad news disclosures might be worse than single disclosures. For example, a going 
concern opinion that also mentions accounting errors might be more negative than a going concern opinion alone. In practice, an attempt to 
rank audit opinions would be fraught with difficulties. For example, is a ‘going concern opinion plus litigation uncertainty’ worse than a 
‘going concern opinion plus accounting error’? Are these multiple unqualified opinions worse than a single qualification? Without answers 
to such questions, a ranking is too subjective and so is avoided. In any case, only 53 (0.28%) reports have multiple negative disclosures, so 
this is not a significant limitation. 
17 Moody’s default data covers bond defaults for companies both rated and unrated by Moody’s. Moody’s compiles default histories from a 
variety of sources including: Industrial, Railroad, and Public Utilities Manuals; reports of the National Quotation Service; The Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle; financial reports; press releases; press clippings; internal memoranda; records of analyst contact with rated issuers; 
and documents from the Securities and Exchange Commission, Dun & Bradstreet, the New York Stock Exchange, and the American Stock 
Exchange. A bond default is defined as any missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, bankruptcy, receivership, or 
distressed exchange where (i) the issuer offers bondholders a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial 
obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount) or (ii) the exchange has the apparent purpose of 
helping the borrower avoid default. 
  17( ), which is measured using total assets. The opinion model also controls for company growth 
( ), which is the annual percentage change in total assets. The association between 
company growth and modified opinions is expected to be negative since low growth can be a 
symptom of poor financial health. The relation between growth and auditor dismissals is expected to 
be non-monotonic because companies that grow or decline rapidly are more likely to change auditors 
compared to companies that grow at a steady rate (e.g., Beattie and Fearnley, 1995). The auditor 
dismissal model captures this non-monotonic relation by including dummy variables for rapid growth 






18 After ranking the sample by growth, GROW  equals one for the 
top 10% and   equals one for the bottom 10%.  
it
it DEC
I expect companies with poor investment opportunities are more likely to receive modified 
audit opinions. The book-to-market ratio ( ) is often used as a proxy for investment 
opportunities but, to my knowledge, it has not been used in prior research on audit opinions.
it BM
19 Since 
investment opportunities are inversely related to the book-to-market ratio, a positive association is 
expected between   and modified opinions. The book-to-market ratio ( ) is also included in 
the auditor dismissal model (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). 
it BM it BM
Table 2 provides variable definitions and descriptive statistics. The non-dummy control 
variables ( ,  ,  ,  , GROWTH ,  ) are highly skewed with outlying 
observations. Sample trimming and log or square root transformations are traditional methods for 
dealing with skewness and outliers, but these procedures are less effective than the rank 
transformations adopted here (e.g., see Kane and Meade, 1998).
it PROF it LIQ it LEV it SIZE it it BM
20 For a variable with N observations 
in year t, each observation is replaced with its corresponding rank (from i = 1, . . . , N in ascending 
                                                          
20 Kane and Meade (1998) find rank transformations contain information that is obfuscated by untransformed variables or alternative 
transformations. In addition, log and square root transformations are not viable for variables with non-positive observations ( ,  it PROF
 
18 The non-monotonic relation between growth and auditor dismissal could also be estimated using a quadratic functional form, but I find 
(unreported) the quadratic specification results in a slightly worse fit compared to the model using growth dummies.  
19 In unreported results, the paper’s conclusions are not found to be sensitive to exclusion of .  it BM
  18order) and the rank assigned to observation i is divided by N+1. The rank transformed variables 
( ,  ,  ,  ,  , and R ) are therefore 
uniformly distributed between zero and one. 
)) ( it LIQ R
5 4 = = =
( it PROF R ) ( it LEV R
0
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3.4 Are there significant reporting differences between retained and new audit firms? 
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 provide results for three audit opinion models (eq. (1)).
21 Column (1) is a 
benchmark model, which imposes the restriction that new and retained auditors do not report 
differently ( 3 ). Column (2) adds the auditor dismissal dummy and interaction terms in 
order to identify reporting differences between new and retained auditors.
 22 The positive coefficient 
on the dismissal dummy ( ) shows new auditors issue modified opinions more often than retained 
incumbents when prior opinions are unmodified. The negative coefficient on D  captures 
the incremental sensitivity of audit opinions to dismissal when prior opinions are modified. The total 
sensitivity of audit opinions to dismissal is negative when prior opinions are modified (
1 − it M
ˆ 3 ˆ 4 γ γ + = 0.17 
- 0.85 = -0.68). Therefore, new auditors issue modified opinions less often than retained incumbents 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it LIQ it GROWTH ,  ). Simulation studies indicate little loss of information even when rank transformations are applied to normally 
distributed variables (Conover and Iman, 1980).  
21 I account for possible dependence between observations relating to the same company by allowing for clustering and by computing 
robust estimates of the coefficients’ standard errors. This procedure assumes that observations are independent between companies but does 
not require independence for multiple observations of a given company.  The standard errors are estimated using the ‘robust cluster’ 
command in STATA. 
22 I also test (unreported) whether the scope for opinion shopping depends on the size of the outgoing or incoming audit firm by including 
in the audit opinion model auditor size dummies and interactions between auditor size and prior opinions. Consistent with extant research 
(e.g., Monroe and Teh, 1993; Krishnan and Stephens, 1995), I find the coefficients on the auditor size dummies and interaction terms are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting the scope for opinion shopping does not depend on audit firm size. A limitation of this test is that audit 
firm size is endogenous since companies choose whether to hire large or small audit firms. The coefficients might be insignificant due to 
two offsetting effects. First, large audit firms are more conservative and so are more likely to issue modified opinions. Second, companies 
that are more deserving of modified opinions are more likely to hire small audit firms. The net effect implies large audit firms are no more 
likely to issue modified opinions even though they are more conservative. It is beyond the scope of this paper to test for the association 
between audit firm size and audit opinions after controlling for the endogeneity of audit firm size.    
  19when prior opinions are modified. The significant reporting differences between retained and new 
auditors ( 0   4 ˆ   , 0   3 ˆ < > γ γ ) imply that scope for opinion shopping exists ( ≠  ). ) 1 0 Pr( = it M
) 1 1 = it
)
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3.5 Do companies successfully engage in opinion shopping? 
The coefficients in Column (3) are used to predict the difference between modified opinion 
probabilities for retained and new auditors ( -) ), and this variable is included in 
the auditor dismissal model (eq. (2)) to test whether companies engage in opinion shopping. Columns 
(4)-(5) show the coefficients on P -  are significantly positive (  = 1.77, 1.75, 
and z = 6.69, 6.62). I therefore conclude that companies successfully engage in opinion shopping 
(H1).
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M
) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
r( ˆ M
1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
)
) 1 0 = it r( P ˆ
1 0 r( ˆ = it M
24  I predict that opinion shopping motivates 142 of the 828 dismissals (17.1%).
25  There is a 
significant improvement in audit opinions for opinion shopping dismissals, but opinions are slightly 
worse for other dismissals. The mean values of P  -    are 17.99% for opinion 
shopping dismissals and -1.73% for other dismissals. These offsetting effects explain why previous 
studies find no significant improvement in audit opinions for auditor dismissals as a whole.  
M
 
23 The effects of the control variables are consistent with prior research. The positive coefficient on prior opinions shows strong persistence 
in audit opinion reporting. The negative coefficients on profitability , liquidity, size and growth show modified opinions are issued more 
often to companies that are small, unprofitable and that have poor liquidity and growth. The positive coefficients on leverage and default 
show companies receive modified opinions more often if they are highly leveraged or in default. The positive coefficient on book-to-market 
reveals companies receive modified opinions more often when investment opportunities are poor. In unreported results, one digit SIC codes 
and year dummies are included in the audit opinion reporting and dismissal models but their effects are jointly insignificant. 
24 The auditor dismissal model cannot control for all possible determinants of dismissal – for example, audit fees are undisclosed during the 
sample period but some companies change auditors in order to pay lower fees. I investigate whether omitted factors confound the results for 
opinion shopping by examining whether 8-K filings disclose the reasons for dismissal. There are 163 companies (19.7%) that disclose why 
auditors are dismissed and the most common reason is the need for lower fees (55 dismissals). When companies that disclose reasons are 
dropped from the sample, the opinion shopping coefficient and level of significance are similar to Table 3 (  = 1.67, z = 5.9). In addition, 
no significant correlation is found between opinion shopping and the company’s propensity to disclose a reason for the dismissal. Since the 
opinion shopping motive and other dismissal motives are uncorrelated, I conclude the opinion shopping coefficient is not biased by omitted 
determinants of dismissal. 
1
ˆ θ
25 An auditor dismissal is predicted to be motivated by opinion shopping if  P  >  .  ) 1
0
r( ˆ = it M ) 1
1
r( P ˆ = it M
  20Interestingly, I find opinion shopping dismissals occur significantly later in the reporting period 
compared to other dismissals. I count the number of days from auditor dismissal to the year-end 
reported on by the new auditor (a dismissal before the year-end has a positive number of days, whereas 
a dismissal after the year-end has a negative number of days).
 The mean (median) number of days is 49 
(28) for the opinion shopping dismissals and 105 (85) for the other dismissals, and the timing difference 
is statistically significant (t = -2.71, t = -4.92 respectively). Opinion shopping dismissals therefore occur 
nearly two months later than other dismissals and there are three possible explanations for this timing 
difference. First, an opinion shopping company delays the dismissal decision until it is reasonably 
certain the incumbent audit firm will give an unfavourable opinion. Second, an opinion shopping 
company delays the auditor change in order to make the audit more difficult for the incoming auditor. 
Third, opinion shopping companies engage in longer search for compliant audit firms.  
 
4. Opinion shopping and the role of audit committees 
This section considers the role of audit committees and addresses the following questions: Are audit 
committees more likely to disapprove of auditor dismissals that are motivated by opinion shopping? If 
so, is turnover amongst audit committee members higher when committees disapprove of opinion 
shopping? In addressing these questions, I use the predicted opinion shopping variable of the previous 
section.  
  Companies disclose in their 8-K filings whether audit committees approve audit firm changes 
but the audit committee’s role is not disclosed when incumbent auditors are retained, so the following 
analysis is for auditor dismissals rather than retentions. This is an important data constraint, as I 
cannot test whether audit committee disapproval affects the likelihood of auditor dismissal. I identify 
whether an audit committee exists by reading 10-K and proxy filings before and after auditor 
dismissals. Filings disclose that audit committees do not exist for 92 dismissals. Filings do not 
disclose whether audit committees exist for 52 dismissals and, in most cases, this probably reflects 
  21the absence of a committee. This leaves 684 dismissals (= 828 - 92 - 52) where audit committees 
exist, and the following analysis focuses on this sample.
26  
  Sub-section 4.1 shows that audit committees are less likely to approve auditor dismissals that 
are motivated by opinion shopping. Sub-section 4.2 shows that this association reflects audit committee 
disapproval (H2) rather than non-participation. Sub-section 4.3 demonstrates that H2 is robust to 
endogeneity and to the non-disclosure of audit committee activity. Sub-section 4.4 shows that the 
departure rate of independent audit committee members is significantly higher when audit committees 
disapprove of opinion shopping. 
 
4.1 The association between opinion shopping and audit committee non-approval 
Table 4 reports the association between opinion shopping (  -  ) and audit 
committee approval ( ). Audit committees approve only 37.8% of opinion shopping 
dismissals (= 37/98) but they approve 64.7% of other dismissals (= 379/586). A chi-square test reveals 
audit committees are significantly less likely to approve dismissals that are motivated by opinion 
shopping (1% level).  
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M ) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
it AP it PA ×
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
  In Table 4, the 268 non-approvals ( it AP it PA ×  = 0) are either due to non-participation (  = 
0) or disapproval ( ). Therefore, there are two competing explanations for the 
association between opinion shopping and audit committee approval. The first explanation is that audit 
committees disapprove of opinion shopping (H2). The second is that audit committees are less likely to 
participate in auditor dismissal decisions when companies engage in opinion shopping, for example an 
it PA
0   , 1 = = it AP it PA
                                                           
26 The frequency of opinion shopping in the three sub-samples (92, 52 and 684 observations) is 30%, 31% and 14% respectively. Univariate 
results (unreported) reveal a significantly lower incidence of opinion shopping when companies have audit committees. However, multivariate 
  22audit committee might leave the auditor dismissal decision to the full board of directors in order to avoid 
conflict with senior management. The next section shows audit committees are not less likely to 
participate when companies engage in opinion shopping, so the association between opinion shopping 
and non-approval reflects disapproval rather than non-participation.   
 
4.2 Is opinion shopping associated with audit committee non-participation? 
Audit committee meeting data are obtained from 10-K and proxy filings for the auditor dismissal year 
( ) and a non-dismissal year ( . MND ). The non-dismissal year is the year prior to auditor dismissal 
or, if meeting data for that year are unavailable, I use the year after dismissal.
it MD i
27 The level of audit 
committee activity equals the number of meetings ( ), and the change in audit committee activity is 
the difference between meetings in dismissal and non-dismissal years (
it MD
. i MND it MD it AM − ≡ ). I use 
the level of, and change in, meeting activity to predict whether audit committees participate in auditor 
dismissal decisions. The level of meeting activity ( ) captures the possibility that an active 
committee discusses the audit firm dismissal as part of its regular meeting schedule. Abnormal meeting 
activity ( ) indicates whether an audit committee holds extra meetings in order to discuss the 
dismissal. As will be shown, the conclusions are robust to using either meeting variable as a predictor of 
audit committee participation. 
it MD
it AM
                                                                                                                                                                                    
results indicate the association is insignificant after controlling for company size, so it cannot be concluded that audit committee existence deters 
opinion shopping. 
27 Proxy and 10-K filings disclose the number of audit committee meetings during the fiscal year but do not disclose meeting dates. It is 
straightforward to measure meeting activity during the auditor dismissal year if the dismissal occurs prior to the year-end reported on by the new 
auditor. However, if the dismissal occurs after the year-end it is unclear which year should be used to measure meeting activity. For example, 
suppose the fiscal year is 1
st January 19X1 – 31
st December 19X1, the outgoing auditor is dismissed on 1
st February 19X2 and the incoming 
auditor issues a report for the year ending 31
st December 19X1. In this example, meeting activity in the dismissal year is measured for the fiscal 
year 1
st January 19X2 – 31
st December 19X2 since this is the period in which the auditor is dismissed. This might introduce measurement error 
because the audit committee could meet to discuss the dismissal before 31
st December 19X1. Fortunately only a minority of dismissals (22.9%) 
occur between the year-end and the incoming auditor’s report and it is found (unreported) that dropping these from the sample does not affect the 
following results.  
  23  Audit committee meetings are undisclosed for 167 auditor dismissals so the sample is 517 (= 
684 – 167).
28 Non-disclosure is a potential cause for concern because a company might not disclose 
the number of meetings if the audit committee does not meet, in which case the disclosed number of 
meetings overstates true activity. Another concern is that audit committees meet to discuss issues 
other than audit firm dismissals and if these issues are correlated with audit firm dismissals there is 
endogeneity bias. Sub-section 4.3 addresses these non-disclosure and endogeneity concerns. 
  Three findings indicate that audit committee meetings are a good proxy for audit committee 
participation. First, there is a significant increase in audit committee meeting activity in the auditor 
dismissal year. The mean change in meeting activity ( ) is 0.45, which is significantly greater than 
zero (t = 6.71). This indicates some audit committees arrange extra meetings to discuss audit firm 
dismissals. Second, when audit firm dismissals are not approved, the increase in meeting activity 
( ) is significantly smaller (0.55 versus 0.26, t = 3.34), and the level of meeting activity ( ) is 
significantly lower (2.65 versus 1.84, t = 5.46). This indicates some audit committee non-approvals 






= it AP = it PA ) rather than disapproval ( , 1 = it PA 0 = it AP ). 
Third, there is a significant increase in meeting activity even when audit committees do not approve 
audit firm changes (the mean value of   is then 0.26, which is significantly greater than zero (t = 
2.30)). This indicates some audit committee non-approvals (
it AM
0 = × it it AP PA ) are due to disapproval 
( ,0 ) rather than non-participation ( 1 = it AP = it PA 0 = it PA ). In summary, audit committees that 
participate in auditor dismissal decisions have higher levels of meeting activity and increase their 
activity during the auditor dismissal year.  
  Attention now turns to the association between opinion shopping and audit committee 
participation. The dependent variable in eq. (3) is the level of meeting activity ( ) and the 
dependent variable in eq. (4) is abnormal meeting activity ( ):  
it MD
it AM
                                                           
28 One year is used to measure meeting activity in the non-dismissal period in order to avoid losing more observations. There is no 
significant trend in meeting activity during the sample period, so it makes no difference whether the non-dismissal period is the year before 
  24it it SIZE R it M it M it MD ψ ϖ ϖ ϖ + + = − = + = ) ( 2 )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0      (3) 
it it SIZE R it M it M it AM ξ κ κ κ + + = − = + = ) ( 2 )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0      (4) 
Eq. (3) is estimated using Poisson since MD   takes discrete non-negative values, and eq. (4) is 
estimated using OLS. 
it
  If the association between opinion shopping and audit committee non-approval (Table 4) 
reflects non-participation, there should be a negative relation between opinion shopping and meeting 
activity ( 0 1< ϖ  and  0 1< κ ). Insignificant coefficients indicate that opinion shopping is associated with 
audit committee disapproval (H2) rather than with non-participation.
29 Eqs. (3)-(4) include company 
size ( ) as a control variable because audit committees of large companies are more active than 
those of small companies (
) it SIZE ( R
0 2 > ϖ  and  0 2 > κ ) (Menon and Williams, 1994).  
  The results are reported in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 5. There is no significant relation between 
opinion shopping and meeting activity ( 1 ˆ ϖ  = 0.34, z = 0.57, and  1 ˆ κ  = 0.10, t = 0.10). This suggests that 
the association between opinion shopping and non-approval reflects disapproval rather than non-
participation. As expected, the association between company size and audit committee activity is 
positive and highly significant ( 2 ˆ ϖ  = 1.18, 1.20, z = 9.68, 10.37, and  2 ˆ κ  = 1.00, 1.01, t = 3.19, 3.30). 
Therefore, audit committees of large companies are more active and are more likely to participate in 
auditor dismissal decisions.
30 The next section explores further the audit committee’s participation and 
approval decisions, and it controls for endogeneity and disclosure bias associated with the audit 
committee meeting variables. 
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or the year after dismissal.  
29 The coefficients  and   are estimated without bias since eqs. (3) and (4) use predicted audit opinion probabilities to capture the 
opinion shopping motive. 
1 ˆ ϖ 1 ˆ κ
  254.3 The association between opinion shopping and audit committee disapproval 
The audit committee’s participation and approval decisions are first modelled jointly using a single 
dependent variable ( ) and later they are modelled separately using two dependent 
variables (  and  ). In eqs. (5)-(6) the dependent variable is the joint participation-approval 
outcome: 
it AP it PA ×
it AP it PA
it it M it M it D M it AP it PA ζ τ τ τ + = − = + + = × )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2
ˆ
1 0      (5) 
it it M it M it M A it AP it PA ρ ς ς ς + = − = + + = × )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2
ˆ
1 0      (6) 
  The meeting variables (  and  ) capture the association between audit committee 
activity and participation. The coefficients 
it D M ˆ
it M A ˆ
1 τ  and  1 ς  are positive if active audit committees are more 
likely to participate in auditor dismissals. The meeting variables are predicted from Columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 5. I use predicted meeting variables rather than disclosed meeting activity for two reasons. First, 
company size is an ideal instrument to control for the endogeneity of meeting activity because it is 
exogenous and because it is a strong predictor of meeting activity. Second, company size data are 
available for all dismissals so estimation results can be obtained using predicted meeting activity for the 
full sample (N = 684), thereby avoiding the problem of disclosure bias.
31  The opinion shopping 
variable ( - ) captures companies’ dismissal motives. The coefficients  ) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M ) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M 2 τ  and 
2 ς  are negative if audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping.  
  The probit estimation results for eqs. (5)-(6) are shown in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 6. A 
significant positive relation exists between meeting activity and the participation-approval outcome ( 1 ˆ τ  
= 0.33, z = 4.77, and  1 ˆ ς  = 1.01, z = 5.26), which confirms that active audit committees are more likely 
to participate in auditor dismissal decisions. The coefficients on the opinion shopping variable are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30 In unreported results, meeting activity shows no significant trend over the sample period and no significant relation is found between 
meeting activity and audit committee size. 
  26significantly negative ( 2 ˆ τ   = -1.88, z = -2.92, and    = -1.79, z = -2.79), which shows that audit 
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  A possible objection to these findings is that the audit committee’s participation and approval 
decisions are modelled as a joint dependent variable, whereas Fig. 1 depicts them as separate sequential 
decisions. Eqs. (7)-(8) address this objection by modelling the audit committee’s participation and 
approval decisions separately:  
it it D M it PA ζ τ τ + + = ˆ
1 0           ( 7 )  
it it M it M it AP ρ ς ς + = + = )) 1 1 r( P ˆ 0 r( P ˆ ( 2 0        ( 8 )  
In eq. (7), the predicted number of meetings ( ) explains participation ( ) and in eq. (8) the 
predicted opinion shopping variable ( -) P ) explains approval ( ). Eqs. (7)-(8) 
are estimated simultaneously using probit models that take into account the sequential decision-making 
process illustrated in Fig. 1, and the partial observability of participation and approval. The following 
likelihood function is programmed and maximized using STATA: 
it D M ˆ
) 1 = ˆ
it PA
0 r( P ˆ
it M 1 1 = it it AP
∏
= ×
= − + Φ Φ −
× ∏
= ×
= − + Φ Φ =
0
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0 ( 1 [
     
1
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it D M ˆ 31 The mean predicted number of meetings ( ) is 2.35 when meeting activity is disclosed (N = 517) and 2.00 when it is not disclosed (N = 
167). The difference (0.35) is statistically significant (t = 5.15) implying companies are less likely to disclose meeting activity when committees 
meet rarely. This validates my concern that the disclosed number of meetings overstates the true level of audit committee activity. 
  27  The results are shown in Columns (3)-(6) of Table 6.
32 The positive coefficients on M  
and   show active audit committees are more likely to participate in auditor dismissal decisions 
(
it D ˆ
it M A ˆ
1 ˆ τ  = 2.18, 4.22, and z = 2.61, 2.65). The negative coefficients on ( -) ) confirm 
that audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping ( = -2.28, -2.29, and z = -2.74, -2.72).
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M
2
ˆ ζ
 33  
   
4.4 What happens when audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping? 
This sub-section tests whether audit committee disapproval of opinion shopping is associated with a 
higher frequency of member departure. I hypothesize that either senior management remove audit 
committee members that disapprove of opinion shopping, or disapproving members leave voluntarily. I 
obtain the names of audit committee members before and after auditor dismissals from 10-K and proxy 
filings. The mean number of audit committee members prior to auditor dismissal ( ) is 2.84, and 




it MEM it MEML ) is 24.1%, so nearly a quarter of audit committee members leave 
during the year.  
Eq. (11) estimates the effect of audit committee participation and approval on member 
departure: 
it it P A it A P it MEM it MEML ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3
ˆ
2 1 0      ( 1 1 )  
                                                           
32 Columns (5)-(6) (eqs. (9)-(10)) are the same as Columns (3)-(4) (eqs. (7)-(8)) except that abnormal meeting activity ( ) is used to 
predict participation. 
it M A ˆ
33 Abowd and Farber (1982) first developed the estimation procedure for sequential decisions and partially observed dependent variables. 
Maddala (1983) (p. 278-280) provides a detailed description of the sequential probit model with partial observability. A simplifying 
assumption of the sequential model is that audit committees’ approval decisions (eqs. (10) and (12)) are defined only on the sub-population 
. This assumption is consistent with the hypothesized decision-making process illustrated in Fig. 1, but one can perhaps argue that 
a joint partial observability model would be more appropriate, for example if audit committees are less likely to participate when they are 
more likely to disapprove. In this case, the approval decision exists even for audit committees that do not participate, and eqs. (10) and (12) 
should be defined for the whole population rather than the sub-population PA . In the joint partial observability model, one needs to 
estimate   in addition to the coefficients in eqs. (9)-(12). The (unreported) results from the joint partial observability models are 
very similar to the sequential models, with the coefficients on meeting activity significantly positive and the coefficients on opinion 
shopping significantly negative (1% level). The results are therefore robust to alternative modelling approaches. 
1 = it PA
1 = it
) ( it it Cov ρ ζ
  28The dependent variable is the number of audit committee members that leave ( ) and eq. (11) 
is estimated using Poisson since MEML   takes discrete non-negative values. The number of 
members prior to auditor dismissal ( ) is a control variable because large audit committees 




0 1> η ). Audit committee participation ( ) and 
approval ( ) are predicted from Columns (3)-(6) of Table 6.
it A P ˆ
it P A ˆ 34 I expect audit committee members 
are more likely to leave when audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping dismissals yet 
companies still dismiss ( 0 3< η ).
35 The results for eq. (11) are shown in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 7. 
The significant negative coefficients on approval ( ) reveal members are more likely to depart 
when audit committees disapprove of opinion shopping (
it P A ˆ
3 ˆ η  = -0.84, -0.82, and z = -2.84, -2.81).
36  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Some studies posit that audit committees are more effective when members are unaffiliated 
with senior management (e.g., Carcello and Neal, 2000). Audit committee members are affiliated if 
they are relatives of senior management, current or former employees, company advisors, officers of 
significant customers or suppliers, or interlocking directors.
37 I use proxy and 10-K filings to identify 
                                                           
34 Since these variables are both predicted, there is no endogeneity problem. 
35 Since audit committee disapproval is predicted using the opinion shopping variable (eqs. (8) and (10)),   indirectly captures the effect 
of opinion shopping on member departure. 
3 η
36 Similar (unreported) findings emerge when the departure model includes the predicted opinion shopping and meeting variables. The 
coefficients on the meeting variables are insignificant, confirming that member departure is not associated with activity. The coefficient on 
opinion shopping is positive and significant, showing audit committee members are more likely to depart when opinion shopping motivates 
auditor dismissals. I perform robustness checks (unreported) to investigate whether the results reflect the confounding effects of omitted 
variables. First, I test whether the results are unique to the audit committee since events other than opinion shopping can change board 
composition and therefore trigger changes in audit committee membership. I find no significant association between opinion shopping and 
the departure of board members who do not sit on the audit committee. Therefore, the association between opinion shopping and member 
departure is unique to the audit committee. Second, financial health variables are included as controls because member departure could be 
caused by financial distress. The financial health variables are jointly insignificant and the association between audit committee disapproval 
and member departure remains significant.  
37 There are two problems in identifying whether audit committee members lack independence. First, there is high turnover of audit committee 
members during the auditor dismissal year and since the dates of member departures and appointments are not disclosed, audit committee 
composition at the auditor dismissal date is unknown. Therefore, it is not possible to correlate opinion shopping with audit committee 
independence at the auditor dismissal date. Second, companies are not required to disclose all affiliations with audit committee members. For 
example, an audit committee member could be a personal friend of the CEO but this would not typically be disclosed. Certain financial ties also 
  29whether audit committee members are affiliated ( ) or independent ( ). I find 8.0% of 
audit committee members are insiders (employed by the company) and 19.6% have some non-
employment affiliation (‘gray’ directors), so 27.6% of members are affiliated - these percentages are 
similar to previous studies (e.g., see Table 2 of Carcello and Neal, 2000).  
it AFF it INDEP
I estimate two variants of eq. (11) to test whether audit committee disapproval is associated with 
the departure of independent or affiliated members. The dependent variable in eq. (12) is the departure 
of affiliated audit committee members ( ), and the dependent variable in eq. (13) is the departure 
of independent committee members ( ):   
it AFFL
it INDEPL
it it P A it A P it AFF it AFFL ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3
ˆ
2 1 0                        (12) 
it it P A it A P it INDEP it INDEPL ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3
ˆ
2 1 0       ( 1 3 )  
Eqs. (12)-(13) are estimated using Poisson because AFFL and    take discrete non-
negative values. 
it it INDEPL
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 7 provide the results for eqs. (12)-(13). Audit committee 
disapproval of opinion shopping is insignificantly associated with the departure of affiliated 
committee members ( 3 ˆ η  = -0.60, -0.59, and z = -1.54, -1.52), but it is significantly associated with 
the departure of independent members ( 3 ˆ η  = -1.11, -1.08, and z = -3.17, -3.14). I conclude that audit 
committees are significantly more likely to lose independent audit committee members when they 
disapprove of opinion shopping (H3). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper tests whether companies engage in opinion shopping and examines the role of audit 
committees when incumbent auditors are dismissed. In contrast to prior US research, I conclude that 
companies successfully engage in opinion shopping. There exists scope for opinion shopping because 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
need not be disclosed, for example Enron’s proxy filing does not disclose contributions made to affiliated organizations of two audit committee 
members (Business Week (Asian Edition), January 21, 2002, pages 38-39). Indeed, clever management might hire directors that appear to be 
  30new and retained audit firms differ in their propensities to issue unfavourable audit opinions. Opinion 
shopping companies take advantage of these reporting differences by dismissing incumbent auditors 
who are likely to give modified opinions and by retaining incumbent auditors who are likely to give 
unmodified opinions.  
I find opinion shopping dismissals occur significantly later than other dismissals. This 
finding should be of interest to regulators as it suggests that a ban on late auditor changes would have 
three benefits. First, it would give an opinion shopping company less time to assess the opinion that 
would be issued by the incumbent audit firm. Second, it would give an opinion shopping company 
less time to search out a compliant audit firm. Third, it would give an incoming audit firm more time 
to assess audit risk and discover underlying problems. 
I find audit committees are more likely to disapprove of audit firm dismissals that are 
motivated by opinion shopping. This is consistent with evidence that active audit committees help 
maintain financial reporting integrity (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow et al., 1996). 
However, independent members are more likely to depart audit committees that disapprove of 
opinion shopping and there are two complementary explanations for this. First, audit committee 
members resign because they do not wish to be associated with opinion shopping dismissals. Second, 
senior management remove disapproving members in order to exert greater control over the audit 
committee and over the auditor dismissal decision. Both explanations imply that the audit 
committee’s role in auditor selection is weaker when managers engage in opinion shopping.  
A caveat to the analysis is that companies do not disclose whether audit committees approve 
auditor retentions, so I am unable to estimate the effect of audit committee disapproval on the 
likelihood of auditor dismissal. The audit committees in my dismissal sample are ineffective since 
auditors are dismissed even when committees disapprove of dismissal. Of course, this does not mean 
audit committees are generally ineffective because the data do not permit me to identify instances in 
which auditors are retained following audit committee disapproval.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
independent but are not, in order to give investors a false impression of having effective corporate governance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  
  31 
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Fig. 1 shows the sequential nature of the audit committee’s decision to participate in and approve an auditor dismissal.  PA = 1 if the audit 
committee participates in the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise.  = 1 if a participating audit committee approves the auditor dismissal 
decision; 0 otherwise. 8-K filings disclose only the joint product of an audit committee’s participation and approval decisions 
( ).  = 1 if the auditor dismissal is approved by the audit committee or 
AP
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Table 1 
Audit opinion types 
  Observations %
Panel A: 
a ( )  0 = it M   
Unqualified opinions without explanatory language  16,844  87.40
   
Panel B:
 b ( )  0 = it M  
Unqualified opinions with ‘harmless’ explanatory language   1,108  5.75
   
Panel C:
 c ( )  1 = it M  
Going concern opinions   1,138  
Going concern + litigation uncertainty  29  
Going concern + related party transactions  1  
Going concern + correction of accounting errors  3  
Going concern + uncertainty about tax payable  1  
Going concern + uncertainty about environmental clean-up costs  1  
Going concern + litigation uncertainty + related party transactions  1  
Going concern + litigation uncertainty + development stage company  1  
1,175 6.10
Panel D:
 d ( )  1 = it M  
Litigation uncertainty  30  
Uncertainty about foreign exchange losses  2  
Uncertainty about losses in Russia  1  
Uncertainty about value of mining assets  3  
Uncertainty about value of accounts receivable  2  
Uncertainty about whether a distribution agreement will be re-negotiated  1  
Uncertainty about consequences of opting out of Master Settlement 
Agreement 
1 
  40 0.21
Panel E:
 e ( )  1 = it M  
Correction of accounting errors  5  
Sale of a significant part of the company’s operations  15  
Revenues come from a limited number of sources  5  
Proposed merger or acquisition  10  
Death of CEO  1  
Possible acceleration of account payable  3  
Significant related party transactions  10  
Restructuring of long-term debt facilities  3  
Restructuring of short-term debt facilities  1  
Company is in development stage  12  
Intangibles comprise a significant part of total assets  2  
Results may not be indicative of those resulting from a stand alone company  4  
Stock repurchase  2  
Company is in breach of statutory insurance requirements  2  
Company has defaulted on its debt covenants  1  
Company is dependent upon its parent for financial support  1  
Company is not complying with SEC filing requirements  1  
Company is subject to a criminal investigation  3  
Company is subject to breaches of warranties and representations in 
connection with a merger agreement 
1 
  82 0.43
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Table 1 (contd.) 
Audit opinion types  
Observations % 
   
Panel F:
 f ( )  1 = it M  
Except for reporting disagreement  6  
Except for limitation on audit scope + going concern   3  
Except for limitation on audit scope + going concern + litigation uncertainty  2  
  11 0.06
Panel G:
 g ( )  1 = it M  
Opinion disclaimer  2  
Opinion disclaimer + going concern  8  
Opinion disclaimer + going concern + litigation uncertainty + significant 
related party transactions 
3 
  13 0.07
   
Total 19,273 100.00
     
Notes: 
Table 1 provides information on the different types of audit opinions issued. Panel A consists of unqualified opinions without 
explanatory language. Panels B-E consist of unqualified opinions with explanatory language. Opinions are grouped into Panels B-E 
according to the type of explanatory language used. Explanatory language is ‘harmless’ (Panel B) if it contains one or more of the 
following statements: (a) the financial statements comply with SEC regulations, (b) the opinion is shared with another audit firm, (c) 
there is a change in accounting principles (d) the current year financial statements are not comparable with those of the previous year. 
Panel C consists of going concern opinions. Panel D consists of fundamental uncertainties. Panel E consists of other emphases of 
matter. Panel F consists of qualified (‘except for’) opinions. Panel G consists of opinion disclaimers. Opinions with multiple bad news 
disclosures are shown separately in Panels C-G.  
a Data source is COMPUSTAT. 
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Table 2 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 19,273) 
        
it D  = 1 if company i dismisses its incumbent auditor; = 0 if the incumbent auditor is retained 
it M  = 1 if company i receives a modified audit opinion; = 0 otherwise (see Table 1) 
it PROF  = Net income/Total assets 
it LIQ  = Current assets/Current liabilities 
it LEV  = Total liabilities/Total assets 
it DEF  = 1 if company i is in default; 0 otherwise 
it SIZE  = Total assets ($ million) 
it GROWTH  = Percentage annual growth in total assets 
it GROW  = 1 if company i’s percentage annual growth is in the top 10%; = 0 otherwise 
it DEC  = 1 if company i’s percentage annual growth is in the bottom 10%; = 0 otherwise 
it BM  = Book value of total assets/Market value 
        
        
 Mean  Median  Min  Max 
 
it D   0.043 0  0  1 
it M   0.068 0  0  1 
it PROF   -0.14 0.03  -452.25  286.67 
it LIQ   3.47 1.99 0  716.67 
it LEV   0.59 0.49 0.0005  496 
it DEF   0.002 0  0  1 
it SIZE   1124.82 87.76  0.001  153498 
it GROWTH   7.26 0.10 -0.99  97579 
it GROW   0.10 0  0  1 
it DEC   0.10 0  0  1 





  38Table 3 
Audit opinion reporting and auditor dismissal models 
  Audit opinion reporting (Eq. (1))    Auditor dismissals (Eq. (2))
           
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5) 
           



















































































































































































































it v it X it D it M it D it D it X it M it M + × + − × + + + − + = 5 1 4 3 2 1 1 0 γ γ γ γ γ γ
it u it Z it M it M it D + + = = + = 2   )   ) 1 1 r( P ˆ - ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0 θ θ θ
       (1)         
                           (2) 
Eq. (1) tests for reporting differences between new and retained audit firms. Eq. (2) tests whether companies engage in opinion shopping 
( ). Robust standard errors are estimated because company observations may not be independent over time (z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses). All columns are estimated using probit. N = 19,273. R(X) = Rank-transformation of variable X. Pr(  = Probability that 
company i receives a modified audit opinion conditional on its dismissal decision (D = 1 if company i appoints a new auditor, D = 0 if company i 
retains its incumbent auditor). The modified opinion probabilities are predicted using the results from Column (3). See Table 2 for other variable 
definitions. * = Statistically significant (5% level, 2-tailed). ** = Statistically significant (1% level, 2-tailed).  
0 1 > ϑ




The association between opinion shopping and audit committee approval 
        
      Is the auditor dismissal motivated by opinion shopping?   
Yes No
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M  >  ) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M ) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M  ≤ ) 1 1 r( P ˆ = it M Total 
No  0 = × it AP it PA   61      207 268 Does an audit committee 
approve the auditor 
dismissal decision? 
Yes  1 = × it AP it PA   37      379 416
   Total        98 586 684
 
Notes: 
Table 4 reports the association between opinion shopping and audit committee approval of auditor dismissal decisions. 8-K filings disclose only the joint outcome of an audit committee’s 
participation and approval decisions ( ) (see Fig. 1).  = 1 if the audit committee participates in the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise.  = 1 if a participating audit 
committee approves the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise.   = Probability that company i receives a modified audit opinion (D = 0 if company i retains its incumbent 
auditor, D = 1 if company i appoints a new auditor). An auditor dismissal is predicted to be motivated by opinion shopping if  . The modified opinion 
probabilities are predicted from Column (3) of Table 3.  
it it AP PA × it PA
Pr( it M
it AP
1 1 = it
) 1 = D
) 1 0 r( P ˆ = it M >) r( P ˆ M
         
      




Audit committee meeting models 
 
  Level of audit committee 
meeting activity (Eq. (3))
  Change in audit committee  
meeting activity (Eq. (4)) 
          
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
          


























it it SIZE R it M it M it MD ψ ϖ ϖ ϖ + + = − = + = ) ( 2 )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0     (3) 
it it SIZE R it M it M it AM ξ κ κ κ + + = − = + = ) ( 2 )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 1 0     ( 4 )  
Eqs. (3)-(4) test the effects of company size and opinion shopping on the level of, and change in, audit committee meeting activity. 
Robust standard errors are calculated (z-statistics are reported in parentheses).    = Number of audit committee meetings in auditor 
dismissal years.  . MND  = Number of audit committee meetings in non-dismissal years.   = Abnormal meeting activity in auditor 
dismissal years  ( ). Columns (1) and (2) are estimated using Poisson because MD   takes discrete non-
negative values. Columns (3) and (4) are estimated using OLS regression. A dismissal is in the sample if 10K or proxy filings disclose 
audit committee meeting activity (N = 517).   = Rank transformation of SIZE , where SIZE  = Total assets ($ million). 
 = Probability that company i receives a modified audit opinion (D = 0 if company i retains its incumbent auditor, D = 1 if 
company i appoints a new auditor). An auditor dismissal is predicted to be motivated by opinion shopping if  > . 
The modified opinion probabilities are predicted from Column (3) of Table 3. * = Statistically significant (5% level, 2-tailed). ** = 
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 Table 6 
Audit committee participation and approval  
  
  Eq. (5)  Eq. (6)  Eq. (7)  Eq. (8)  Eq. (9)  Eq. (10) 
          
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
          


















































it it M it M it D M it AP it PA ζ τ τ τ + = − = + + = × )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2
ˆ
1 0                  (5)                 
it it M it M it M A it AP it PA ρ ς ς ς + = − = + + = × )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2
ˆ
1 0                  (6)        
it it D M it PA ζ τ τ + + = ˆ
1 0                                                                                    (7)            
it it M it M it AP ρ ς ς + = − = + = )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2 0                                               (8) 
it it M A it PA ζ τ τ + + = ˆ
1 0                                                         (9) 
it it M it M it AP ρ ς ς + = − = + = )) 1 1 r( P ˆ ) 1 0 r( P ˆ ( 2 0                                             (10) 
Eqs. (5)-(10) test the effects of meeting activity and opinion shopping on audit committee participation and approval of auditor 
dismissals. Robust standard errors are calculated (z-statistics are reported in parentheses). Eqs. (5)-(6) are estimated using standard probit 
models. Eqs. (7)-(10) are estimated simultaneously using sequential probit models of partial observability (Abowd and Farber, 1982). N = 684. 
= 1 if the audit committee participates in the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise. AP = 1 if a participating audit committee 
approves the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise.  MD  = Number of audit committee meetings in auditor dismissal years. MND  = 
Number of audit committee meetings in non-dismissal years. AM   = Abnormal meeting activity in auditor dismissal years   
( ).   and    are predicted from Columns (2) and (4) of Table 5. Pr(  =  Probability  that 
company i receives a modified audit opinion (D = 0 if company i retains its incumbent auditor, D = 1 if company i appoints a new 
auditor). An auditor dismissal is predicted to be motivated by opinion shopping if P >) . The modified opinion 
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Table 7 
Audit committee member departure 
  
  Departure of all 
audit committee  
members  
Eq. (11) 
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Notes: 
it it P A it A P it MEM it MEML ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3
ˆ
2 1 0    (11) 
it it P A it A P it AFF it AFFL ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3 ˆ 2 1 0    (12) 
it it P A it A P it INDEP it INDEPL ψ η η η η + + + + = ˆ
3
ˆ
2 1 0                    (13) 
Eq. (11) tests the effect of audit committee participation and approval on the departure of audit committee members. Eq. (12) tests the 
effect of audit committee participation and approval on the departure of affiliated audit committee members. Eq. (13) tests the effect of 
audit committee participation and approval on the departure of independent audit committee members. Robust standard errors are 
calculated (z-statistics are reported in parentheses). A dismissal is in the sample if 10K or proxy filings disclose audit committee 
membership before and after auditor dismissal (N = 457). Eqs. (11)-(13) are estimated using Poisson because the dependent variables take 
discrete non-negative values. MEML  = Number of audit committee members that leave during the auditor dismissal year.  MEM  = 
Number of audit committee members prior to auditor dismissal.  AFFL  = Number of affiliated audit committee members that leave 
during the auditor dismissal year.    = Number of affiliated audit committee members prior to auditor dismissal. An audit committee 
member is ‘affiliated’ if he/she is an employee of the company, a former employee, a relative of senior management or has other business 
relations with the company. INDEPL   = Number of non-affiliated (‘independent’) audit committee members that leave during the 
auditor dismissal year.  INDEP  = Number of non-affiliated audit committee members prior to auditor dismissal.  = 1 if the audit 
committee participates in the auditor dismissal decision; 0 otherwise. = 1 if a participating audit committee approves the auditor dismissal 
decision; 0 otherwise. In Columns (1), (3) and (5),   and   are predicted from Columns (3)-(4) of Table 6.  In Columns (2), (4) and 
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